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GENESIS OF A 13ATE: WORKMEN'S
COMPENSAT][ON INSURANCE
The problems presented to those learned in the law vary from
reflection on sordid practicality' to contemplation on the infinity of
time and space.2 Somewhere between these, related to both, is the
field of Workmen's Compensation insurance rate-making. A recent
Minnesota decision3 on this intricate' problem presents compelling
questions of substance and procedure. The importance of the de-
cision cannot be overemphasized. The field is one in which basic tech-
niques can change considerably and in which the governing con-
ditions are never static. Further, compensation insurance agencies
work with varied statutes, procedures and formulas; judicial
interference in this process has heretofore been at a minimum. With
this as a background, a multiplicity of important considerations
have avoided thorough investigation. The instant case is important
not only because of the impetus it will give to such investigations
but because of the encouragement it will provide to those who seek
to contest rates.
In question in the instant case was the revision in the overall
state rate level adopted by the Minnesota compensation insurance
board5 for the year beginning January 1, 1951. The Minnesota
compensation rating bureau6 had recommended a 10.6% increase;
1. See People v. Tilley, 104 N. E. 2d 499, 500 (Ill. 1952).
2. See Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, 189 F. 2d
952, 954 (2d Cir. 1951).
3. State ex rel. Minnesota Employers' Ass'n v. Farcy, 53 N. W. 2d
457 (1952).
4. For treatment of the general problem and for definitions and ter-
minology, see Riesenfeld & Maxwell, Modem Social Legislation 372 (1950) ;
Riesenfeld, Basic Problems in the Administration of Worknlen's Compensation,
36 Minn. L. Rev. 119, 138 (1952). See also Michelbacher & Nial, Work-
mens Compensation Insurance 282 (1925) ; Graham, The Practice of Work-
ve s Compensation Ratemaking az Illustrated by the 1939 Revision of New
York Rates, 26 Proc. Casualty Actuarial Soc'y 47, 63 (1939); Johnson,
New York Compensation Rate Making, 35 Proc. Casualty Actuarial Soc'y 6
(1948) ; Kulp, The Rate-Making Process in Property and Casualty Insurance
-Goals, Technics, and Limits, 15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 493 (1950).
5. The board, provided for by Minn. Stat. § 79.02 (1949), has the
obligation of approving a "minimum and adequate and reasonable rate for
each classification." Minn. Stat. § 79.07 (1949).
6. The Minnesota compensation rating bureau, a quasi-public agency
established at the same time as the board and comprising all the carriers of
Workmen's Compensation insurance (the insurers) in Minnesota, assists the
board in the rate-making process. See Minn. Stat. § 79.11 et seq. (1949),
Yoselowitz v. Peoples Bakery, Inc., 201 Minn. 600, 277 N. W. 221 (1938).
The bureau was joined as a defendant in the instant case and appears to
have conducted the active defense. The National Council on Compensation
Insurance is the country-wide carrier organization which collects and tabu-
lates information and develops overall rate-making policy. In connection
with the efficacy of such arrangements, compare the argument over the
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the board granted an 8.2% increase which included a 2.5% provision
for profits and contingencies. The Minnesota Employers' Assoc-
iation opposed any increase, first at the hearings before the board,
then by certiorari in district court, and finally by appeal to the
Minnesota Supreme Court.
TaE MAECHANICS OF RATE-MAKING
The history and principles of compensation insurance rate-
making have been well summarized in two recent works, 7 and the
general technique will therefore be set out here only in brief.
Employment activities are broken down into 660 individual
classifications,s each of which has its own manual classification
gross rate, so that an employer can be assessed properly for the
hazards he engages in. An employer does not, however, pay simple
rates for his enterprises because of the existence of merit rating
plans" which make the actual collectible premium dependent upon
actual experience and size of policy. What he does pay is based on
payroll units of exposure'0 of $100. Since the compensation prem-
iums should furnish the carrier sufficient income to cover both the
actual benefit payments and underwriting expenses and profit,
the rate for each classification is actually composed of two elements
called pure premium and expense loading. Actually, in each rate
revision the classification relativity for certain select classifications
are revised on the basis of actual experience in that classification.
The fundamental theory of compensation insurance rate-making
is that the experience of prior years will be duplicated in the year
for which the rate determination is to be made. The two most recent
policy years" for which experience is available are used as a base.
Actual past experience, however, must be converted to figures which
represent existing conditions. The effect of merit rating plans and
changes in premium and benefit payment levels must therefore be
compensated for in bringing payment figures up to date in usable
function and usefulness of railroad rate bureaus set forth in Dumbauld, Rate-
Fixing Conspiracies in Regulated Industries, 95 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 643, 655
(1947).
7. Riesenfeld & Maxwell, op. ci. mipra note 4, at 375; Riesenfeld, supra
note 4, at 138.
8. Minn. Compensation Board, 14th Bienn. Rep. 9 (1951).
9. Experience Rating, Retrospective Rating, and Premium Discount
plans are the types now in use. See Riesenfeld & Maxwell, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 380.
10. Extra pay for overtime is omitted in computing units of exposure.
11. The policy year includes the experience of all policies written. dur-
ing a specified 12 month period, and therefore it extends for two years from
the first day of a new rate. See Riesenfeld & Maxwell, op. cit. supra note
4, at 377.
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form. Elimination of the "off-balance" due to merit rating plans
gives standard earned prentiun, ;12 use of present rates on actual
payrolls gives the current collectible premium. Incurred losses are
converted to inodified losses by adjustment for statutory changes in
the benefit payment level.
It is desirable that modified losses shall have a specified pro-
portion, called the permissible loss ratio,13 to collectible premiums,
and the indicated change in rate level is found by comparison of
computed loss ratios to the permissible. However, because benefit
payments lag behind wages and because the basic experience used
is at least two years old, these adjusted figures are not reflective
of current conditions. It has recently been deemed advisable,
therefore, to introduce a new "trend" factor-the rate level adjust-
inent factor,'14 which is based on the variation between the latest
calendar year actual loss ratio and the permissible loss ratio. The
indicated change in rate level so revised is then further and finally
adjusted by re-insertion of the "off-balance" factor.
The Minnesota compensation insurance board applied these
accepted calculations, but went further in seeking to arrive at pres-
ent day conditions. It applied wage factors to the adjusted premiums,
on the assumption that wages would increase 32 per cent in 1950
over 1949; and in doing so the board confused its factors and
years.1 5 The board applied medical and indemnity cost adjustment
factors which assumed that these elements of loss would vary as
12. The "off-balance" factor is recomputed by the National Council on
Compensation Insurance every two years, and is applied during the statis-
tical tabulation by that body. Actually, current collectible premium is ob-
tained simply by using current manual rates with "off-balance" excluded.
Riesenfeld & Maxwell, op. cit. supra note 4, at 377.
13. The permissible loss ratio was formerly 61% in Minnesota, Minn.
Compensation Board, 14th Bienn. Rep. 13 (1951), although a more ac-
cepted figure is 60%, exclusive of a profit and contingency factor. Riesenfeld
& Maxwell, op. cit. supra note 4, at 376.
14. See Riesenfeld, supra note 4, at 139; Minn. Compensation Board,
14th Bienn. Rep. 12 (1951) ; Minn. Compensation Board, 13th Bienn. Rep. 15
(1949).
15. Wage level figures (average weekly wage) were obtained from
the Minnesota Employment and Security Division. Calendar years were
converted to policy years by computation after separation into quarters. The
3Y2% increase was an estimate; modification of previous yearly experience was
done in the following manner:
For 1948 (1948 Adjusted Rate Level) times (1950 Wages\ 1949 Wages
For 1947 (1947 Adjusted Rate Level) tnes ( 1950 Wages
Nt1948 WagesNote the impure multiplication.
[Vol. 36:948
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did wages and that prior factors had been correct.' 6 It finally applied
an accident frequency-severity factor which had little apparent
justification.
17
The court reviewed these adjustments and the assumptions on
which they are based. Although it did not attack the basic formula
and conceded that there was "no certainty that mathematically
sound adjustments would produce results more accurate than those
used by the board," it adopted the view that whether "the rate
developed is reasonable can be ascertained by determining the
reasonableness of the components." Those components are the pure
premium and expense loading portions of the rate. In investigating
these components, the court found that the board's order did not
meet the test of adhering to "methods logically calculated to produce
a reasonable rate."
The background in the instant case included a history of profit-
able rates for the insurance carriers,"' although the Minnesota
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17. The factor and the method of arriving at it is presented for what-
ever logical value one can derive from it. The U. S. accident severity rate (in
days per 1000 man-hours) was added to the U. S. accident frequency rate (in
injuries per 1,000,000 man-hours) to give what is called the frequency-severity
ratio. This was then subtracted from parity (100) and divided by 100 to give
the frequency-severity correction factor, which was then multiplied by losses
to give a loss figure corrected for the improved safety conditions. It should
be observed that the higher the frequency and severity rates, the lower the
adjusted losses, so that with sufficient accidents this formula would give
the -omewhat inconsistent result of no losses at all.
18. That history may be summarized as follows:
Policy Years Actual Loss Ratio Differeice between Actual










board is perhaps more independent in its actions than the typical
compensation insurance board."9 The court acknowledged the diffi-
culties of prospective rate-making and the inability of anyone to
state that a reasonable rate would certainly result, but it regarded the
prior inaccuracies as making it "especially necessary that the
methods adopted by the board be carefully scrutinized." The board's
function in this situation is to "use all sources of information and
experience in a reasonable manner to set a rate which will pro-
duce results as close as possible to what is desired."
The court was dissatisfied as well with the board's change of
the permissible loss ratio from 61% to 58.5 %.20 It pointed out
that only the principle, not the amount, had been approved by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners,21 and that there
was no evidence in the record which would justify such a change.
Mere approval by the board did not make it reasonable: "such a
ratio can be established only after appropriate findings on expense
requirements and what constitutes a reasonable profit."
Actually, a revision of the basic rate formula seems proper. This
conclusion is reinforced by recent proposals for changes in several
factors, including the newly adopted rate level adjustment factor.22
19. Latest figures for overall increases show:
Requested Approved as Such Lesser Award No Action
52 33 17 2
These figures contain duplications in a number of states, including the three
most recent requested increases in Minnesota, none of which were approved
without reduction. The average discrepancy between request and grant in the
17 cases was 3.3%; in three cases increases were asked for but decreases were
given. National Council on Compensation Insurance, Ann. Rep. 9-11 (1952).
20. The added cost of premiums is actually 4.3% because with expenses61
constant the total premium varies as: 6' = 1.04273.
21. National Council on Compensation Insurance, Ann. Rep. 15 (1952).
A so-called emergency loading of 2.5% was used in the depression. Minn.
Compensation Board, 5th Bienn. Rep. 5 (1933). A "contingency factor" was
later included in the expense loading and a cumulative total of profits was
kept, this contingency factor being manipulated to assure, in theory, pro-
tection against accumulated losses. See Minn. Compensation Board, 6th
Bienn. Rep. 5 (1935); cf. Rober, Recent Developments in the Compensa-
tion Rate-Making Procedure, Proc. 1937 Convention IAIABC, U. S. Dep't
of Labor, Div. Labor Stds. Bull., No. 17 at 45 (1938). This was attacked in
district court in three cases which were not appealed. See Minn. Compen-
sation Board, 9th Bienn. Rep. 18, 23 (1941); Minn. Compensation Board,
10th Bienn. Rep. 14, 16 (1943). After the 10th Biennial Report, however,
this factor disappeared without comment or explanation.
22. Proposed changes include: calculating the rate level adjustment
factor by using the latest 12 months experience as a base with changes made
in fact-gathering to afford use of more recent data; attempting to put claims
adjustment expense under losses rather than expenses; correcting for off-
balance with a uniform country-wide factor of 1.030. National Council
on Compensation Insurance, Ann. Rep. 4 (1952). Note in this connection that
despite a long period of favorable through inaccurate results, general revision
[Vol. 36:948
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The corrections needed are suggested by the requirements of the
problem. The board should utilize the latest information available
at its hearings to establish a rate which will preserve its validity
over its entire effective period. The data used need not be derived
from insurance sources,2 3 but the rate formula adopted should pro-
duce a fair proportion of accurate loss ratios when checked empiri-
cally using the conditions of previous years.
2 4
ADEQUATE RETURN AND REASONABLE RATES
The formulation of Workmen's Compensation insurance rates
is not a common subject of judicial scrutiny.2 5 The burden of oppos-
ing a rate order, considerable even before a commission, becomes
discouraging under the usual judicial tolerance toward adminis-
trative discretion and expertise.2 6 The significance of the instant
case derives not from the easily variable mechanics of the process
but from the role the court assumes in assuring that the adminis-
trative agency will attain its statutory goal of "minimum and
adequate and reasonable" rates.
The most sophisticated judicial thinking on the question of rate-
making was developed from a series of gas and oil cases culminat-
of the rate-making formula was not given serious consideration until the
trend was reversed. Cf. Fondmiller, Can State Figures on Average Cost
Per Case be Used? Proc. 1946 Convention IAIABC, U. S. Dep't Labor,
Div. Labor Stds. Bull., No. 87 at 113 (1947).
23. Use of wage figures from the Division of Employment and Security
is an example of the profitable use of outside figures.
24. For example, actual cost of specified medical services might be
correlated to the accident frequency and severity rates and the benefit
payment level to ascertain the statistical significance each has on overall losses.
It would also seem to be more proper, until shown to be false, to use trends
as to each factor. The argument contra is that predictions are useless because
of the many variables and uncertainties; this, however, does not justify
the static approach now used, particularly in the light of the lack of success
it has produced.
25. Almost always the application of a rate to a particular employer,
not the state rate level itself, is attacked. See, e.g., Rice v. Continental Cas.
Co., 153 F. 2d 964 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Gene Autry Productions, Inc. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 67 Ariz. 290, 195 P. 2d 143 (1948) ; State v. Hughes Electric
Co., 51 N. D. 45, 199 N. W. 128 (1924) ; State v. Industrial Comm'n, 125
Ohio St. 272, 181 N. E. 99 (1932). In some states the "state-fund" plan is
used and private carriers are not involved in the rate-making process. See
Riesenfeld & Maxwell, op. cit. supra note 4, at 391; Riesenfeld, supra
note 4, at 137; State Fund Round Table, Proc. 1940 Convention IAIABC,
U. S. Dep't Labor, Div. Labor Stds. Bull., No. 46 at 154 (1941). For a general
listing of state organizations, see Fletcher, Workmen!s Compensatioi Inisr-
ance and Its Rate Administration, 10 Ins. Counsel J. 32 (1943).
26. Cf. Aurora v. Commissioner of Taxation, 217 Minn. 64, 97-98, 14
N. W. 2d 292, 310 (1944) ; State v. Tri-State Tel. and Tel. Co., 204 Minn.
516, 526, 284 N. W. 294, 302 (1939) ; Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry., 69
Minn. 353, 376, 72 N. W. 713, 716 (1897) ; see Roberts, Tax Valuationm of
1innesota Iron Ore, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 389, 435 (1950) ; 35 Minn. L. Rev. 661
(1951).
1952]
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ing in the Hope Natural Gas case, 27 in which the Supreme Court
held that in determining the reasonableness of a rate all that need
be shown is a fair "impact" or "end result," considering the effect
on the soundness and stability of the public utility involved. This
doctrine was conceived to free determinative bodies from unrealistic
concepts of due process,2 8 and it serves such purpose adequately. 2
There must be some limitation, however, to the freedom given a
commission, and it is generally found in the lack of evidence sup-
porting the findings.30 Thus the bare statement of a finding is not
sufficient,3 1 and a formula if used must be correctly applied.3 2 To
uphold a rate where there is nothing in support would be to assume,
gratuitously, that the agency was acting properly on broader ques-
27. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944). See also FPC
v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575 (1942) (predecessor to Hope) ;
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F. 2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U. S. 952 (1951) (consequences analyzed). See generally Brown,
The Ghosts of the Hope Natural Gar Decision, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 398 (1944) ;
Hale, Utility Regulation in the Ligh, of the Hope Natural Gas Case, 44 Col.
L. Rev. 488 (1944) ; Welch, Status of Regulatory Commissions under the
Hope Natural Gas Decision, 32 Geo. L. J. 136 (1944); Wheat, Does Hope
Case Mean Direct Approach to "Fair Retur);"? 33 P. U. Fort. 531, 617
(1944) ; 32 Minn. L. Rev. 60 (1947). Cf. State v. Tri-State Tel. and Tel.
Co., 204 Minn. 516, 532, 284 N. W. 294, 305 (1939) : "Confiscation proceeds
from the result reached, not from incidental errors made in reaching it. Our
review is in consequence restricted to a determination of the conclusions
which the evidence put in by the state will reasonably sustain."
28. "Whatever the remaining right of judicial review may be, or the
criteria of confiscation, the court has firmly established the presumption that
rates fixed by a regulatory body are in fact just and reasonable. It no longer
leaves the federal court open, almost eagerly ready, to undertake review' on
any claim or pretense of confiscation or due-process violation, to retry and
redetermine the facts, and really to take over the rate-making function."
Bauer, Transforming Public Utility Regulation 151 (1950).
29. See, e.g., Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 635
(1945) ; Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 581 (1945) ; Potomac
Electric Power Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 158 F. 2d 521 (D.C. Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 816 (1947). Some disfavor has been shown at
the application of the Hope doctrine to situations where statutory require-
ments are explicit. See id. at 533 (dissenting opinion).
30. But note the comment that ". . . when the Supreme Court sets aside
administrative actions for supposed lack of adequate findings, one is often
left in doubt as to whether the real reasons relate to clarity of findingg or to
judicial disagreement with administrative policy." Davis, Administrative
Law § 158 (1951).
31. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F. 2d 11, 16 (D.C. Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 952 (1951) : "The only reference to rate of
return in the Commission's opinion is that 'a return of less than 4% is
obviou-ly inadequate to maintain the Company in a sound financial position.!
Commission expertise alone cannot support so pivotal an aqsumption ...
Without any evidence on this essential issue, there is no basis for applica-
tion of any standard and the judicial review authorized by the statute be-
comes a formal but futile gesture."
32. Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 163 F. 2d 433, 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1947): 'When the Commission announces principles or formulae as
applicable, the validity of its order can be determined only by measuring
what it does against the principles it announces."
[ ol. 36:948
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tions.33 Thus "end result" is not an abstraction which precludes
judicial scrutiny of the components of the rate.3 4
State courts have not regarded the rule of the Hope case as the
true and given word.35 This can be explained largely on the basis
that state court interpretations in rate cases have been statutory
or in line with state precedent and have not reached the Fourteenth
Amendment due process issue. There are fundamental differences
as well in the status of the parties and the nature of the suit which
might preclude consideration of the doctrine. Thus, in the instant
case the board is allied with the carriers and does not need the
support of the "impact" doctrine; the employers cannot invoke the
rule since the court would then be a rate-making body. Further,
there are a considerable number of carriers of varying structure:
they may be of national or local scope, organized on a stock or
mutual basis-the mutuals, and some of the stock carriers, writing
participating policies which pay dividends to the buyer. And these
carriers must be regulated as to only the compensation insurance
segment of their insurance business. Nor are all the employers
likely to complain of high rates.36 Of course, since compensation
insurance rates exist separately, profits must be computed sepa-
rately, and, therefore, if the carriers ever assume a position antago-
nistic to the board some concept like "end result" must ultimately
be considered. The ratio essendi is the same in insurance as in
utilities-the carriers can seek no more than a wholesome financial
integrity in a regulated industry.
The "impact" rule has been applied to insurance rate-making
in a case parallel, in some respects, to the instant case-Jordan v.
American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. 87 The case involved regulation of the
rates of some 200 companies, and in dictum the court showed re-
33. For example, one question is whether the rate is proper in com-
parison to rates for other services, and another is whether it is correct
in view of cyclic economic trends. For some hidden considerations in the
making of rates see Fisher, What Says the Court? Criteria for Utility
Regulation. 44 P. U. Fort. 856 (1949).
34. See 'Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 163 F. 2d 433, 451 (D.C.
Cir. 1947).
35. Nemmers, The Hope Case-Pandora's Box, 45 Ill. L. Rev. 460, 469
(1950) Rose, The Bell Telephone System Rate Cases, 37 Va. L. Rev. 699
(1951) ; Note, 33 Geo. L. J. 70 (1944) ; 30 B. U. L. Rev. 120 (1950).
36. Employers who get non-participating policies suffer directly from
high rates which enable stock carriers to remain in business while non-
stock carriers return high dividends. But these employers, though members of
the employers' association, are generally small and unorganized. Employees
and the public are affected only indirectly.
37. 169 F. 2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948), 33 Minn. L. Rev. 771 (1949).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
luctance38 to follow previous holdings3 which would require the rate
to be satisfactory to the highest cost company. It looked askance as
well at the use of a system of graduated rates, because that would
have the practical result of tending to monopoly by squeezing out
those unable to compete at the lowest rate. The most appropriate
result, therefore, would be a consideration of all interests, including
that of the public. 40
A distinction has been dra.wn, as to review of rate-making,
between the substantive requirement of fairness in the result and
the procedural requirement of fairness in reaching that result."'
Under normal practice, however, the result cannot be ascertained,
so the method of computation alone is decisive. Thus the court
in the instant case based its determination solely on the inadequate
and improper method of reaching the result.
One unsolved problem is that of giving proper credit to the
investment income of the carriers in the computation of a rea-
sonable profit. This was early considered by the Minnesota com-
pensation insurance board but was dropped as impractical.42 In view
of the number of carriers, their numerous modes of doing business
and the complexities of the computation itself, it may well be that
not even an employers' association would seriously seek to pursue
the subject. But if an appreciable amount is involved it goes to the
crux of determining a fair profit; even without information sup-
plied to it the expert board still might be obliged to develop the
necessary data itself.4 3
38. Id. at 293: "If constitutional validity is to be determined by con-
sideration of the several companies separately, the only valid uniform rate
would be that fixed by the experience of the company with the highest
expenses. Such surely is not the requirement of due process."
39. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 275 U. S. 440 (1928) ; Missouri Rate
Cases, 230 U. S. 474 (1913) ; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913).
40. Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F. 2d 281, 293 (D.C.
Cir. 1948), 33 Minn. L. Rev. 771 (1949) : "On the other hand, if constitutional
validity can be tested by a reasonable figure fixed by the general experience
of all, the public interest against monopoly, the companies' interest in rea-
sonable return, and the incentive toward good management by the companies
would all be well-served." See also Bauer, Transforming Public Utility
Regulation 7 (1950).
41. See Nemmers, The Hope Case-Pandora's Box, 45 Ill. L. Rev. 460,
469 (1950) ; cf. Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F. 2d 281, 287
(D.C. Cir. 1948), 33 Minn. L. Rev. 771 (1949).
42. See Minn. Compensation Board, 2d Bienn. Rep. 13 (1927), which
said there was ". . . no practical way of considering this source of revenue
when making compensation rates." Cf. Johnson, New York Compensation
Rate Making, 35 Proc. Casualty Actuarial Soc'y 6 (1948), where an attempt
was made to consider the extent of such earnings and the conclusion was
that they were not important.
43. Minn. Stat. § 79.07 (1949) : "The board shall, in approving these
rates, make use of the experience which from time to time may be available
[Vol. 36:948
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The true amount of return to the carrier is also worth some
scrutiny by the board.4 4 In compensation insurance, profit is nor-
mally considered on the basis of premium volume. The use of this
basis, however, may mean a high rate of return on investment-
or a considerably higher amount than that needed to preserve the
carrier as a going concern under the "impact" rule.
45
The basic division of carriers of compensation insurance into
stock and mutual companies would of itself be unobjectionable were
it not for the fact that the stock companies have basic expenses
about 14% (of the total premium) greater than the non-stock.46
After initial perturbation the board announced that all companies
should enjoy rates sufficient to provide a profit to the stock com-
panies because (1) to do otherwise would discriminate, (2) buyers
of participating dividends get dividends, and (3) stock companies
take smaller risks with higher costs.4 7 Use of this rationale means
that the participating insurance buyer pays effective premiums de-
pendent not only on the state rate level and his own merit rating but
on the experience of his carrier as well, which controls the dividend
amounts. Some argument can be made that profits are reduced by
the amount of dividend payments, but against this is the fact that
rates paid are then indisputably higher than actually required. The
court in the instant case avoided examination of this question by
saying simply that the "formula is devised on the basis of standard
earned premium, and it is on that basis that the accuracy of the
rate set must be determined." Preservation of the carrier dichotomy
is of questionable necessity, but in the end the only clear-cut solu-
tion is legislative.
48
and of such other helpful information as may be obtainable." See Rep. Comm.
Statistics, Proc. 36th Convention IAIABC, U. S. Dep't Labor, Bureau Labor
Stds. Bull., No. 142 at 203 (1950), indicating a general inadequacy of ad-
ministrative data.
44. However, this would require an analysis of the capital investment
involved in underwriting compensation insurance, entailing a complex correla-
tion of compensation insurance to the entire casualty insurance field.
45. It should be remembered that when rates are too high, agents'
commissions and taxes are higher than they would be with a proper rate,
making realized profit less, but not diminishing the error. See Bauer, Trans-
forming Public Utility Regulation 112-114 (1950). On the theory of rate of
return generally, see Tatham, A New Look at Rate of Return, 46 P. U. Fort.
867 (1950).
46. This arises largely because of their higher acquisition costs: nation-
wide, for the year ending December 31, 1949, commissions and brokerage ex-
penses were 13.39% for stock companies and 2.54% for non-stock. Minn.
Compensation Board, 14th Bienn. Rep. 21 (1951) ; see Riesenfeld, supra note
4, at 140. The difference is due to the fact that mutuals write policies directly
while stock companies employ commissioned insurance agents.
47. Minn. Compensation Board, 2d Bienn. Rep. 10 (1927).
48. See Riesenfeld, supra note 4, at 140-141. It might be desirable to
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EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW
Exponents of practicality in jurisprudence can find numerous
delights in rate-making cases. There are still virgin questions of the
appellate function in general49 and of realistic review in particular.
In the instant case the court determined that the agency action
was unsustainable because where it purported to apply mathematical
logic that logic was erroneous, and where it approved a new factor
it stated no basis for its conclusion. In any view which concedes
that judicial corrective action may sometimes be necessary, the
result was sound and the approach salutary, for the immediate
powers of the board were not circumscribed and no arbitrary gen-
eral requirements were imposed; the court was not compelled to
use novel legal concepts due to application of old dogma to a new
practical situation. Essentially its holding was on insufficiency and
inaccuracy of findings.9 0 In this it took an orthodox viewpoint. "
It requires no theorizing, however, to raise questions which the
court might have answered. The time consumed in judicial review
placed the question of 1951 rates before the Minnesota Supreme
Court in 1952. Because of the importance of the case the court
might have thought to (if it did not actually do so) substantiate
use an escrow fund system for a given portion of the rates, permitting refunds
to all buyers if rates were found to be excessive in fact. Re-establishment of
the old contingency factor, if used to equalize profit, would also act as a
partial stabilizer. While this makes subsequent buyers in a sense the bene-
ficiaries of previous gains and the sufferers from previous losses it is still
a conformity to the prior practice and the statutory mandate.
49. See Dickinson, Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations,
a Summary and Evaluation, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 588 (1941); Hoshour, Pro-
posed Legislation Pending in the Congress and in the Minnesota Legislature
Concerning the Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions, 29
Minn. L. Rev. 157 (1945) ; Riesenfeld, Bauman & Maxwell, Judicial Control
of Administrative Action by Mean., of the Extraordinary Remedies in Mii7nne-
sota, 33 Minn. L. Rev. 569, 685 (1949).
50. Comparison of the 13th Biennial Report of Minnesota compensation
board with the 14th reveals them to be nearly identical in many sections as
well as in format, while in its earlier reports the board displayed wide compre-
hension and initiative. This may not be significant, but it does not aid the
claim of careful independent scrutiny by the board. The court also might draw
its own conclusions as to the skill of the board from its review of the record
in the case. Samples taken from it include (these are admittedly hand picked) :
Board member: "What I am trying to get at, Mr. King, is this-I
am probably just as confused as you are or anybody else around this room
over these figures." Record, p. 169.
Board member: "Mr. Chairman, I suggest these two actuaries get
together for a couple of minutes and work out their minds between them.
... I am very frank to say I don't understand what you are talking about
and I would like to have it in 'English." Record, p. 222.
51. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947) ; Morgan v.
United States, 298 U. S. 468, 480 (1936) ; cf. Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co. v.
FPC, 324 U. S. 626, 634 (1945) ; see Davis, Administrative Law § 158 et seq.
1951).
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the result it reached by later data.5 2 Some of this information would
be of such a nature as to almost compel its use,53 while other facts
would be of doubtful certainty although of great persuasive effect. 54
The court in sum could decide between (1) assuming the perspec-
tive of the board at the time it made the rates and (2) adopting
a position of enlightened post-vision. The first is unrealistic wherever
it reaches a result contrary to, and by the exclusion of, already
ascertainable facts. The second raises a problem of the extent of
judicial notice within the broader limits of official notice, 5 but it
should certainly govern where the later facts are readily available,
indisputable, and decisive of the issue. Where of lesser value they
should not preclude general considerations of fact or policy. One
such consideration here is the prior history of rate-making by the
board. Previous aberrations from the norm could not be decisive
because. the court did not attack the basic formula," but they are
one reason for not accepting the findings when they were improperly
supported.
5 7
The court evidently left the board free, on remand, to make
its own interpretation of what data to use to correct the previous
rate determination. The board can either use all the information
available presently or only that available at the prior hearings.
There seems little doubt but that the first is proper, and more de-
sirable, where a lengthy delay is involved-here it was one and
52. If, as in Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry., 69 Minn. 353, 377, 72
N. W. 713, 716 (1897), "... . on appeal from the commission the court should,
to the best of their ability, take judicial notice of all such technical learning,
knowledge, and information of a general character as should be known and
understood by the commission," then it should not close its eyes to later and
more valuable information of the same nature which was not available to
the commission.
53. For instance, the board was requested to grant an 8.3% increase
due to a law amendment change in benefit levels in 1951, but only allowed
3.5%, and it disallowed a requested 7.8% increase for 1952. National Council
on Compensation Insurance, Ann. Rep. 11 (1952).
54. The National Council on Compensation Insurance has recently
indicated that loss ratio experience is becoming unfavorable. National Council
on Compensation Insurance, Ann. Rep. 1 (1952). This is very strongly borne
out by Minnesota experience figures which became available after the deci-
sion in the instant case was filed. These show an actual loss ratio for the
calendar year 1951 of 72.4%, something which might have given the court
real trouble. Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Expense Exhibit for
Calendar Year 1951, compiled by compensation insurance board for Legisla-
tive Interim Committee.
55. On notice generally, see Davis, Administrative Law § 150 et seq.
(1951).
56. It is questionable, however, whether consistently high rates should be
permitted. Compare Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n,
158 F. 2d 521, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 816 (1947) with
United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 158 F. 2d 533, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 331 U. S. 516 (1947).
57. Market Street Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U. S. 548 (1945).
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one-half years. With a lesser time interval, however, the court
might see considerable value in limiting the board to prior data
only, since this would compel correction of method and eliminate
the natural tendency of the board to justify its first determination by
selected later data.
The court was undoubtedly aware that the board, after remand
and reinvestigation, might return the same or a higher rate. Yet
the standards imposed on the board may compel it to abandon its
casual approach to rate-making, and might ultimately result in
establishment of a sound rate-making system,5 8 so that reversal was
not a useless act.59 Many of the problems presented here could be
minimized by statutory provision for prompt judicial review of such
important questions.
CON'CLUSION
Workmen's Compensation insurance rate-making problems
cannot be solved from the hazy security of the ivory tower.00 Sound
administration demands close examination of questions which vary
from the mathematical to the constitutional; the instant case is a
careful entry into this complex field. Even more, however, it is
an effective judicial correction of administrative defection.
58. The court cannot, and should not, consider the nature of the adminis-
trative investigation, or whether more hearings are necessary. United States v.
Morgan, 313 U. S. 409, 422 (1941) ; see Davis, Administrative Law § 101
(1951).
59. Cf. FPC v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 336 U. S. 577, 583 (1949), 34
Minn. L. Rev. 66, stating that funds might be impounded and then dis-
tributed by the lower court after determination of the parties who would have
benefitted. See Note, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1023 (1950) ; 65 Harv. L. Rev. 521
(1952). The court might have regarded an added profit factor as wholly
unjustified, since although it might be desirable to have profit provided for ex-
plicitly, it need not necessarily be taken from the pure premium portion of the
rate. If the permissible loss ratio is incorrect it should be changed; insertion
of a profit figure merely makes the formula less flexible and sets an arbitrary
profit minimum.
60. Rodell, Woe Unto You, Lawyers! 258 (1939).
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